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This paper will examine the effectiveness of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia at
providing some measure of transitional justice to the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. It delves into an
expanded role of tribunals that extends beyond the courtroom and seeks to highlight faults and success
of the ECCC as lessons for future iterations of international courts and tribunals.
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia:
An Extraordinary Success or an Ordinary Failure?
Vamika Jain | University of Toronto ’22
“They killed men with sticks, tied them up by the neck, and
burned them alive… one could no longer drink the water
because there were so many corpses floating on the
surface… Every day we lived in fear, in poverty, in grief, in
a tragedy that we had never before known.”
Pech Tum Kravel spoke these words in a witness statement,
testifying to the inhumanity of the Khmer Rouge at the 1979
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) in Cambodia.1 Along with
Kravel’s deposition, the tribunal itself has remained obscure for
decades, dismissed from both domestic and international attention.
The fledgling PRT marked the beginning of a long struggle for
transitional justice in Cambodia.2 The most recent iteration of this
campaign is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal intended to prosecute leaders
of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime for their blatant violations
1

“Mr. Pech Tum Kravel,” in Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial
of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, eds. Howard De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J.
Robinson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 102.
2
Rachel Hughes, “Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, no. 4 (2015):
717-9.
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of both Cambodian and international law. The tribunal offered the
Cambodian people an opportunity for “moving forward through
justice”—but after twenty-three years, has it delivered on its
promises?3 Such questions on the effectiveness of this long and
expensive tribunal deserve to be addressed. The present study will
argue that while the ECCC has certainly failed in delivering the
most fundamental conceptions of material justice—including truth,
accountability, and appropriate punishment—it has also achieved
remarkable success in supporting victim participation, generating
public deliberation, and encouraging national reconciliation.
Highlighting these areas of success, the article looks at the
expanded role of tribunals extending beyond the courtroom and
seeks to illustrate the perceptions of justice that exist beyond a
court’s verdict.
Theoretical Framework
Examining the ECCC’s effectiveness requires a robust analytical
framework. In order to provide theoretical grounding for such a
framework, this paper identifies the hybrid tribunal as a form of
transitional justice, which the International Centre for Transitional
Justice broadly defines as “ways countries emerging from periods
3

“It’s Time for the Record to be Set Straight” (poster printed by Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, March 3, 2011),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/publication/its-time-record-be-set-straight.
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of conflict and repression address large-scale or systematic human
rights violations.”4 Prominent legal scholar Ruti Tietel narrows this
definition by arguing that it applies specifically to ideas of “justice
associated with periods of political change,” such as regime
changes or shifts in authority, and primarily involves addressing
the “wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” through
various legal responses such as prosecutions, truth commissions,
reparations, and political reform.5 As a tribunal established by both
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia to
prosecute violations of humanitarian law by its predecessor regime
of Democratic Kampuchea, the ECCC fits this definition.6 Policy
scholar David Crocker has identified eight primary goals for such
mechanisms of transitional justice: “truth, a public platform for
victims, accountability and punishment, the rule of law,
compensation to victims, institutional reform and long-term
development, reconciliation, and public deliberation.”7 Here these

4

“What is Transitional Justice?” International Centre of Transitional Justice,
https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.
5
Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights
Journal 16 (2003): 69; Michael Newman, Transitional Justice: Contending with
the Past (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019), 27-47.
6
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, United NationsCambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 UNTS 117.
7
David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,”
Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1999): 43-64.
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eight goals will be used as the basic structure for measuring the
ECCC’s success. However, Crocker’s goals are occasionally
simplistic and blind to relevant historical narratives. Moreover,
they are specific to liberal and democratic political transitions, and
are intended to ambiguously apply to all forms of transitional
justice, not just tribunals. Conversely, scholars such as Theresa
Squatrito et al. and Gutner and Thompson have developed
analytical frameworks that apply specifically to international
organizations and tribunals, while historians such as Rebecca
Gidley have altered these models to the distinctive context of
Cambodian history.8 This article will employ research in political
theory and historical narratives from Gidley and Squatrito et al. to
modify Crocker’s goals, overcome some of their limitations, and
adapt them to a framework appropriate for the assessment for the
ECCC.

8

Theresa Squatrito, Oran R. Young, Andreas Follesdal, and Geir Ulfstein, “A
Framework for Evaluating the Performance of International Courts and
Tribunals,” in The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals, eds.
Theresa Squatrito, Oran R. Young, Andreas Follesdal, and Geir Ulfstein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3-36; Tamar Gutner and
Alexander Thompson, “The Politics of IO Performance: A Framework,” Review
of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010): 227–248; Rebecca Gidley,
Illiberal Transitional Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019).

32

Historical Background: Democratic Kampuchea
In April 1975, the French-educated revolutionary Pol Pot led the
rebel forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), also
known as the Khmer Rouge, as they took over Cambodia and
proclaimed the new state of “Democratic Kampuchea.”9 While
numerous factors contributed to the radicalization that spurred on
the Khmer Rouge, a primary reason was the U.S. government’s
secret bombing campaign against Vietnamese troops in Cambodia
in the latter years of the Vietnam War.10 Further destabilizing the
nation’s already-weakened regime and alienating large
communities of Cambodians, these falling bombs were the last
straw required by the Khmer Rouge to break government defences
and take control of Phnom Penh.
What followed was the attempted establishment of absolute
control and a subsequent devastation of Cambodian lives. As
recorded in endless pages of harrowing testimony, soldiers forcibly
deported Cambodians to the countryside, “sieved [intellectuals and
civil servants] from the population,” punished disobedience with
brutal executions—typified by “the naked body of a man, nailed to
a door”—and regularly committed mass killings, one of which
counted “one hundred fifty-seven persons, which included women
9

Aaron Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals: A Comparative Examination (New
York: Springer, 2015), 2-4.
10
Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 3.
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eight months pregnant.”11 The Khmer Rouge remained in power
until a Vietnamese invasion in January 1979. Estimates suggest
that between 1.5 to 2.25 million Cambodians died under the fouryear regime due to “targeted killings, starvation, overwork, and
lack of sanitation and medical care.”12 The wounds carved onto
Cambodian bodies and the Cambodian nation, however, are much
larger in number, and the process to deliver justice to victims took
decades to begin.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
“The creation of the Cambodia Tribunal—spanning 1997 to
2006—took longer than the creation of any other international or
hybrid criminal tribunal in the post-Cold War era,” recalled David
Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes
Issues.13 Notably, it took nearly eighteen years from the fall of
Democratic Kampuchea in 1979 for this process to even begin at
11

“Mrs. Yasuko Naito,” in Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of
Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, eds. Howard De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J.
Robinson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 96-101; Peter
Manning, Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia (London: Routledge,
2019), 39.
12
Ben Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death
Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80,” Critical Asian Studies
35: 585-597; Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander, “Justice and The Past,” in The
Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia, eds. Katherine Brickell and Simon
Springer (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2016), 42.
13
David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes
Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 343.
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an international level. This was because, for most of the 1980s and
early 1990s, the Khmer Rouge was protected by the geopolitical
dynamics between China, America, and the Soviet Union,
remaining key political players in the Cambodian government.14
This made their prosecution impossible; any minor attempts at
justice, such as at the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of 1979,
were soon dismissed due to their lack of public and international
support. 15 It was only in 1996 when Ieng Sary, co-founder of the
Khmer Rouge, agreed to disarm remaining rebel troops in
exchange for amnesty that his faction’s political influence began to
falter.16 Coinciding with the party’s weakened grip on power and
growing international interest in action against its leaders, the coprime ministers of Cambodia finally wrote a letter to the United
Nations Secretary General in 1997, requesting support in “bringing
to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.”17 The
process that this letter began remained slow, hindered by domestic
red tape and international power politics. The UN and the
Cambodian government engaged on multiple points of contention,
14

Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 32-33.
Hughes, “Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law,” 717-19.
16
Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 35-36.
17
Gidley, Illiberal Transitional History, 109; United Nations General Assembly,
“Letter Dated 21 June 1997 from the First and Second Prime Ministers of
Cambodia Addressed to the Secretary-General,” A/51/930, 24 June 1997.
15
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such as the precise composition of the ECCC and the court’s
standing with respect to the Cambodian legal system.18 After
multiple rounds of negotiations, the UN General Assembly passed
the final agreement on the ECCC on 22 May 2003, with conditions
and concessions on both sides. The years immediately after were
spent fundraising and laying administrative framework until, in
July 2006, the judges for the court were sworn in and the ECCC
was officially functional.19
Structure of the Court
The ECCC has jurisdiction over crimes committed between 17
April 1975 and 6 January 1979.20 The crimes that the court can
adjudicate are genocide, crimes against humanity, and breaches of
the Geneva Convention. The persons that it can prosecute are
carefully defined as the “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea
and those who were most responsible.”21 The structure of the court

18

Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 40-41.
Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 44-45.
20
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia, art. 1; Ernestine E. Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge:
Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized National
Tribunal,” in Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone,
Kosovo and Cambodia, eds. Cesare P. R. Romano, André Nollkaemper, and
Jann K. Kleffner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211.
21
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia, art. 9, 2; Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 212-14.
19
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itself is two-tiered, with a Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court
Chamber that serves as both “appellate chamber and final
instance.” The court’s composition is a unique hybrid model
wherein the Trial Chamber consists of three Cambodian and two
international judges, and the Supreme Court Chamber consists of
four Cambodian and three international judges. Judges must seek
unanimity in their decisions but, when impossible, a supermajority
of at least four judges in the Trial Chamber and five judges in the
Supreme Court Chamber is acceptable.22 Finally and most
importantly, the Cambodian government has an obligation to
provide support, enforce decisions, and make arrests “without
undue delay” based on requests made by the ECCC.23
Critical Assessment: Truth
Having established the foundations of the ECCC’s history and
mandate, it is now essential to assess its effectiveness. The first
measure for examining the performance of this delayed and
carefully constructed hybrid tribunal is the goal of “truth.”
According to David Crocker, this involves investigating,
establishing, and disseminating a true record of past atrocities and

22

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia, art. 3, 4; Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 217-21.
23
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia, art. 25.
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their consequences, allowing victims and future generations to
engage with an accurate public account of how various
occurrences have shaped their past and present.24 Crocker indicates
that the ability to arrive at such a record is dependent on the
process of investigation.25 Therefore, to assess the ECCC, this
article expands Crocker’s definition to include the measure of
“process performance.” Proposed by Squatrito et al., this refers to
demonstrated procedural fairness and efficiency standards in court
and tribunal proceedings.26 Therefore, the ECCC’s performance
under the goal of “truth” is measurable at two levels: the process
performance of the court as a justice-seeking mechanism, and the
successful dissemination of an accurate historical record.
The first measure under process performance is procedural
fairness. Unfortunately, despite the painstaking process of
negotiating the ECCC’s composition, multiple allegations of
political interference by the Cambodian government in defence of
certain Khmer Rouge leaders have mired its proceedings.27 The
most serious of these allegations pertain to Cases 003 and 004 at
the ECCC, wherein the defendants are former mid-level leaders of
24

Crocker, “Reckoning,” 49-50.
Crocker, “Reckoning,” 51-52.
26
Squatrito et al., “A Framework,” 16.
27
Tomas Hamilton and Michael Ramsden, “The Politicisation of Hybrid Courts:
Observations from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,”
International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 1 (2014): 115.
25
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the CPK. The Cambodian judges of both chambers and team of
Cambodian prosecutors have consistently prevented the
proceedings from moving forward in court, and the Cambodian
police has not issued arrest warrants, leading international coprosecutor Andrew Cayley to claim that the government had
planned to protect the cases’ defendants.28 These allegations of
political interference significantly undermine both the investigation
and the alleged veracity of its produced historical record.
Furthermore, the continued prevalence of former Khmer Rouge
leaders and combatants in Cambodian political life means that
allegations of corruption are rampant against all levels of the
ECCC’s administration.29 While the veracity of these claims has
not been established, the sheer number of them certainly casts a
shadow on procedural fairness.
On efficiency, moreover, the ECCC has only succeeded in
convicting three defendants over the course of seventeen years,
with an expenditure of more than $300 million.30 Its hybrid nature
and the inherent conflict between national and international
interests has caused its proceedings to move at a painstakingly

28

Kheang Un, "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search
for Justice," The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 4 (2013): 78.
29
Hamilton and Ramsden, “The Politicization of Hybrid Courts,” 129-131.
30
Seth Mydans, “11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal Worth It?” April 10, 2017, The New York Times.
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slow pace, with an exceptionally inefficient use of resources.31 The
record of truth that the ECCC is making available to the public is
thus heavily limited in comparison with what could be possible
with a more efficient usage of time and resources.
The second level of assessment, examining the court’s
ability to make available an accurate public record of the historical
wrongdoings suffered by Cambodians, reveals further failures and
concerns. Craig Etcheson, former chief of investigations at the
ECCC’s Office of Co-Prosecutors, describes how the court’s
remarkably rich archival record of testimony and trial-proceedings
is inaccessible to the Cambodian public, to scholars, and to
international parties alike. He states that while the government has
established a Legal Documentation Centre, it has not been updated
beyond a partial documentation of Case 001. The state remains
hesitant to provide any further access.32 More significantly,
scholars are worried that under the hybrid nature of this court the
Cambodian government will seize all documentation after the
completion of the ECCC’s mandate. This would mean that “printed
documents could be selectively destroyed, and the electronic
31

Mikkel Jarle Christensen and Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, “Competing
Perceptions of Hybrid Justice: International v. National in the Extraordinary
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia," International Criminal Law Review 18,
no. 1 (2018): 127-53.
32
Craig Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice: Law, Politics and the Khmer Rouge
Tribunals (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 348.
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version could be subtly altered,” completely falsifying the record
of truth being established by the court.33
Therefore, assessing the ECCC’s progress towards the goal
of “truth” reveals significant failures of process performance,
challenged fairness, inefficient proceedings, and an unreliable
production of historical records that are largely inaccessible to
Cambodians.
Public Platform for Victims
Crocker’s second goal for transitional justice is the provision of a
public platform for victims of past atrocities to describe their
experiences.34 When applying this measure to the ECCC, however,
it is important to note that these proceedings are taking place
nearly three decades after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. This adds
distinctive challenges to both the process of reaching out to victims
and asking them to relive harrowing memories from a generation
ago.
The ECCC has a dedicated section for Victim Support that
engages in regular legal outreach, inviting victims to participate in
trial proceedings. Victim Support must ensure the protection of
victim interests by effectively disseminating relevant information,
33

Grant Peck, “Experts Weigh the Record of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge
Tribunal,” Associated Press, November 17, 2018.
34
Crocker, “Reckoning,” 52-53.
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ensuring legal representation, and acting as a bridge between the
co-prosecutors and the victims.35 Estimates suggest that this branch
has contacted “more than half a million Cambodians within
Cambodia, and some thousands in the diaspora,” overcoming the
challenges of lost time since the fall of the Democratic
Kampuchea.36 Outreach to diaspora Cambodians indicates that
even those who have moved away from the immediate proximity
to the proceedings and their consequences have received the
opportunity to reckon with and seek justice for past sufferings.
Victim participation in the proceedings operates under two
primary mechanisms. The first is the process of filing a
“complaint,” wherein victims can submit information to the court.
Investigators and prosecutors may use this information and may
call the complainant to present evidence at trial.37 The second
option for victims is participating in the proceedings as a “civil
party,” having demonstrated that they directly suffered due to the
crimes committed by the defendants. Civil parties have co-lawyers
to represent them and have specific rights within the trial, such as

35

“Victims Support Section,” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support-section.
36
Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 49.
37
Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 47; “EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA INTERNAL RULES
(REV.9),” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Phnom Penh,
January 16, 2015.
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the right to call witnesses or to make submissions, appeals, and
closing statements. While only ninety civil parties participated in
Case 001, around 4,000 parties did so in Case 002, representing the
success of Victim Support’s legal outreach and the ECCC’s ability
to provide a platform to victims. 38 While victim rights at trial have
certainly seen restrictions in recent years, including the
consolidation of multiple civil rights claims and the distribution of
the case into mini-trials, the rate of victim participation and the
degree of outreach conducted remain remarkable.39 Furthermore,
described as ground-breaking legal precedent by international legal
scholars, the ECCC is one of the first international courts to
implement civil party participation at such a scale.40 This indicates
that under the goal of providing a public platform for victims, the
ECCC demonstrates significant success.
Accountability and Punishment
According to Crocker, successful mechanisms of transitional
justice must be able to hold those responsible for historical

38

Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 48.
Mélanie Vianney-Liaud, “Emerging Voices: Victim Participation in ICC and
ECCC’s Proceedings,” Opinio Juris, August 20, 2015.
40
Sarah Thomas and Terith Chy, “Including the Survivors in the Tribunal
Process,” in On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process, eds. John D.
Ciorciari and Anne Heindel (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia,
2009), 214.
39
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atrocities accountable for their crimes and must deliver appropriate
punishment to such individuals.41 Expanding on this definition,
Squatrito et al. argue that the ability of tribunals to successfully
hold defendants accountable is dependent on the court’s ability to
successfully resolve judicial disputes and arrive at decisions.42
Therefore, to prove effective at the goal of accountability and
punishment, the ECCC must show demonstrated success at dispute
resolution and at delivering appropriate punishments to those who
are responsible for the horrifying scale of suffering under the
Khmer Rouge.
The hybrid nature of the court, with a mix of international
and national judges, prosecutors, and investigators at each level of
the system, results in a consistent conflict of interests among the
primary decision-makers of the process.43 Etcheson narrates how
tension between these duelling perspectives is present at
foundational levels of the process, recalling how “internationals
were focused on procedure and process, while the nationals were
focused on politics and product” at every step.44 Since decisionmaking requires either unanimity or supermajority, this binary
cleavage has significantly disabled the court’s ability to make

41

Crocker, “Reckoning,” 53-54.
Squatrito et al., “A Framework,” 14.
43
Christensen and Pederson, “Competing Perceptions,” 144-45.
44
Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice, 341.
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efficient progress in the prosecution and punishment of criminals
on trial.45 The necessity for a supermajority, in conjunction with
the binary divide within the judges, also means that the likelihood
of the dismissal of conflicts without decision is extremely high.46
These drawbacks in the ECCC’s dispute resolution and decisionmaking capacities significantly reduce its ability to successfully
agree upon the accountability and punishment of various
defendants that stand trial within it.
Furthermore, the ECCC’s scope is limited to a strict
definition of the most “senior leaders” of the Khmer Rouge—i.e.,
those who were most responsible for committing crimes. Defining
this category, however, is fraught with subjective claims of
leadership and responsibility. The Cambodian government’s
resistance towards prosecuting Case 003 and Case 004 is partly
because the defendants were not part of the top echelon of Khmer
Rouge leadership. 47 Prosecuting them would then open the doors
for the widespread prosecution of several other officials at a
similar level in the regime. Nevertheless, in spite of their nonseniority, the defendants were responsible for approximately
40,000 deaths, and therefore bear a massive burden of

45

Christensen and Penderson, “Competing Perceptions,” 144-45; Etcheson,
Extraordinary Justice, 340-343.
46
Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 217-21.
47
Un, “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” 78.
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responsibility for the genocide and crimes against humanity
committed.48 The challenges faced by the court in the prosecution
of cases such as 003 and 004 are indicative of limitations on its
capacity to hold prominent criminals responsible for their actions.
Additionally, hurdles faced by the ECCC include the fact that its
proceedings are underway more than three decades after the crimes
were committed. Not only does this mean that many of the most
responsible leaders have died without punishment, but it also
makes the process of tracing and identifying such individuals
additionally difficult.49
Therefore, these limitations encumber the ECCC’s
effectiveness under the goal of holding wrongdoers accountable for
their crimes and assigning them appropriate punishment.
Rule of Law
Crocker’s fourth goal of transitional justice states that, in
reckoning with past wrongs, compliance with the rule of law is
necessary, as is the attempt to lay groundwork for the future
development of law. Squatrito et. al. applies a similar framework
when assessing the effectiveness of international courts and
tribunals. They identify the “[facilitation of] compliance with
48

Christensen and Penderson, “Competing Perceptions,” 151.
Duncan McCargo, “Politics by Other Means? The Virtual Trials of the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal," International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011): 614-15.
49
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international law” and the “clarification of law” as two important
measures for the outcome performance of court systems such as
the ECCC.50
The hybridity of the ECCC makes it a unique legal
precedent formed within the confines of Cambodian law, but with
roots situated in an agreement signed between the United Nations
and the Cambodian government.51 On the one hand, its definitions
of the crimes within its scope draw heavily from international
conventions such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1998 Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court.52 On the other, the chambers
themselves exists within the Courts of Cambodia; the Cambodian
government enforces the tribunal’s decisions and administrators
draw most procedural rules from the national legal system.53
Consequently, the tribunal has the striking position of facilitating
compliance with, establishing precedent for, and clarifying both
international law and domestic law simultaneously. Importantly, it

50

Squatriro et al., “A Framework,” 10-11.
Anne Heindel, “Overview of the Extraordinary Chambers,” in On Trial: The
Khmer Rouge Accountability Process, eds. John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel
(Phnom Pneh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2009), 85.
52
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also sets further precedent for future tribunals seeking similar
hybrid models.
While the ECCC is not the only hybrid tribunal in
contemporary history, its model for victim participation was
certainly unprecedented when first established, replicated only
partly at the International Criminal Court at The Hague. Never
before had victims for mass human rights violations “been
accorded such a highly visible role as ‘civil parties’ in the criminal
proceedings against their oppressors.”54 The ECCC goes a step
beyond simple participation by affording victim rights to civil
parties at trial proceedings, and has since engaged with these rights
on multiple occasions, both restraining and expanding them.55 This
creates a wealth of replicable legal procedures future international
courts and tribunals that might be established in the future.
Unfortunately, since most of the ECCC’s proceedings are
still ongoing and public access to documentation on trial
proceedings and decisions remains limited, it is not yet evident
what the court’s holistic role in clarifying or advancing
international and domestic law has been.56 However, its striking
54

Thomas and Chy, “Including the Survivors,” 286.
Ken Gee-kin Ip, “Fulfilling the Mandate of National Reconciliation in the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – An Evaluation
through the Prism of Victims’ Rights,” International Criminal Law Review 13,
no. 4 (2013): 865-94.
56
Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice, 346.
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placement at a cross-section of international and domestic law, and
its unprecedented employment of victim participation mechanisms
indicate that it is well-placed to leave a measurable impact on both.
Compensation to Victims
Crocker’s fifth goal for transitional justice is that all victims of
human rights violations must receive appropriate compensation,
“in the form of income, property, medical services or educational
and other opportunities.”57 Once again, the timing of the ECCC’s
proceedings complicates the direct application of this goal. While
identifying and verifying victims after the significant gap of time is
already a challenging process, to appropriately measure and
allocate material compensation would be nearly impossible. The
court’s internal rules have consequently established that victims
can only seek “collective and moral” reparations from its
proceedings.58 To assess whether the ECCC is able to demonstrate
any success at this goal, it is important to examine whether such
non-material and non-individualistic reparations are acceptable to
the victims. A population-based survey conducted after a
successful conviction at the ECCC’s first trial asked participants
what they thought would be the best way to offer individual
57

Crocker, “Reckoning,” 57.
“EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA
INTERNAL RULES (REV.9),” rule 23.
58
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reparations to victims of the Khmer Rouge. While more
respondents recommended that victims and families should receive
social services such as education and healthcare, the second most
popular recommendation was for “trials and punishment of
wrongdoers.”59 This indicates that while the ECCC’s moral
reparations might not be the most desirable option, they are
certainly a close second for contemporary Cambodians. Therefore,
while the ECCC is unable to offer any material compensation to
victims of the Khmer Rouge, its efforts at prosecuting the greatest
culprits certainly offer some form of restitution to those who have
suffered most at its hands.
Institutional Reform and Long-Term Government
Crocker defines his sixth goal for transitional justice as the
prevention of recurring conflict and human rights violations
through the establishment of stronger institutions and economic
development.60 As a tribunal, the ECCC plays little to no role in
the advancement of economic development. Furthermore, since the
ECCC involves multiple international actors, concerns over

59
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national sovereignty limit the degree to which the government
allows it to participate within it. However, a fair assessment of the
court’s role in institution building in Cambodia must examine its
impact on the health of Cambodian legal institutions.
Since the 1997 letter from the co-prime ministers of
Cambodia to the UN Secretary General, international and national
staff have worked together at various levels to build, operate, and
sustain the ECCC.61 Scholars, lawyers, administrators, lobbyists,
diplomats, and journalists from around the world have spent
decades working with the Cambodian government to ensure the
sustenance of this tribunal. Gidley describes how the International
Bar Association has conducted training sessions in international
law for Cambodian lawyers, and how the Defence Support and
Victim Support sections have provided relevant training programs
to law students, while Etcheson reflects on the possibility of skilltransfer after decades of collaboration.62 Two-way exchanges of
knowledge and experience are inevitable, and this heavy
engagement with international bodies will act as a model of best
practices for Cambodian institutions, making them robust enough
to survive periods of political unrest.63
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Given these circumstances, the ECCC has contributed
significantly, within the confines of its role, to the strengthening of
domestic institutions in Cambodia.
Reconciliation
Crocker’s seventh goal is the ideal of national reconciliation, or the
ability for former enemies to work toward greater social
cohesion.64 While the ECCC’s proceedings are far from complete
and its full impact on the social and psychological underpinnings
of Cambodian life is yet to be seen, the tribunal’s public
proceedings have caused Cambodians to directly confront the
horrors of their past. For decades, victims of inhumane suffering
persisted through a political system that continued to place their
oppressors in positions of power. 65 Growing accustomed to this
suppressed history, only 64% of respondents to a population-based
survey in 2008 indicated that truth and justice were important steps
towards reconciliation. However, as the first trial ended, this figure
jumped to 81% of respondents in 2010, indicating that the trial and
its outreach system were allowing Cambodians to recognize the
importance of confronting their past, their trauma, and their former
enemies.66 Additionally, a vast spectrum of local and international
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NGOs, some trained and supported by the United Nations and
others developing grassroots support, have emerged around the
ECCC, particularly its Victim Support Section. These
organizations have developed a significant number of operations
such as reconciliation walks, public forums of discussion,
documentation laboratories, therapy centres, informal hearings,
and more to advance outreach and reconcile Cambodian victims.67
The impetus for these efforts and much of the initial support they
received would have been impossible without the ECCC.
Therefore, while history will observe the ECCC’s broader impact
on national reconciliation in upcoming decades, the tribunal has
effectively sparked the process within Cambodian society.
Public Deliberation
Crocker’s final goal states that any attempt at transitional justice
must generate active engagement in the public sphere, open
deliberation, and marked interest in its progress.68 Not only does
this ensure the wider dissemination of its goals and incentives, it
also generates greater transparency and public investment in its
sustained success. Remarkably, the Khmer Rouge tribunal has
commanded an unprecedented degree of international and national
67
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public engagement for the entirety of its ongoing duration. By
September 2017, nearly 550,000 people had attended hearings
from the courts’ public galleries.69 The ECCC outreach program,
assisted by donors from around the world, disseminated regular
television broadcasting, radio shows, podcasts, media coverage,
and school lectures to bring the debates around the ECCC to every
household around the country, and many across the world.70 As
Cambodians in the hundreds of thousands tune in to watch daily
broadcasts, such a level of public engagement is unprecedented
within genocide trials.71 Consequently, it is evident that levels of
public deliberation associated with the ECCC are remarkably
effective.
Conclusion
Drawn-out over decades, inefficient and limited, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have failed in delivering
Cambodians the reliable truth about their history under the Khmer
Rouge. As a hybrid tribunal, it has even failed at effectively
holding the perpetrators of heinous human rights violations
accountable, has been unable to deliver appropriate punishments,
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and can only offer limited moral reparations to their victims.
However, in spite of these glaring failures, the ECCC has not been
entirely ineffective. With unprecedent success at victim
participation, support for stronger institutions, a kickstart at
national reconciliation, and immense public deliberation, the
tribunal has allowed Cambodians to confront the atrocities of their
past and to take steps towards recovery. This analysis has
demonstrated an expanded definition of justice and effectiveness
that allows for an emphasis on these underlying successes of the
ECCC. In doing so, it has enabled the identification of modellable
characteristics within the tribunal for improvement, adaptation, and
implementation around the world. The ECCC’s motto says,
“moving forward through justice.” While the tribunal may have
failed to deliver material justice to the victims of the Khmer
Rouge, it has had important success in helping Cambodians take
steps towards “moving forward.”
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